Research & Publications: Libya

In 2011, many observers predicted that relations between Libya and Egypt would become closer after both countries underwent similar revolutions followed by attempts at democratic transition. But three years later, the realization of this prediction appears unlikely. Political realities and ideological differences have led to a relationship that is contentious at best.

The Libyan uprising launched almost three years ago has yet to produce the promised transition to a new post-Qaddafi political order. The moment of unity generated by toppling the tyrant has fragmented due to the fact that, unlike Tunisia or Egypt, no state apparatus existed to take over from the victorious rebels. Transitional authorities under the National Transitional Council (NTC, March 2011-August 2012) were too weak to govern and acquire legitimacy. Their successor 200-member constituent assembly, the General National Congress (GNC) elected in July 2012, has not fared much better due to dysfunctional politics, factional disputes, pervasive distrust, a legacy of institutional destruction, and sporadic resistance by former members and supporters of the toppled regime, as well as historical, regional, and tribal cleavages.

In the wake of the revolutionary fervor that has swept the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011, retributive justice has taken precedence over restorative justice approaches as countries seek to address human rights violations.

In May 2013, Libya’s General National Congress (GNC) overwhelmingly passed the Political Isolation Law (PIL). The PIL’s enactment represented a far-reaching attempt to prevent members of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi from holding public office during the country’s transition. But the decision also appeared to fit a precarious pattern of post-conflict accountability in Libya, which has been characterized by acts of vengeance and one-sided justice aimed at anyone associated with the defeated regime. The passage of the law also reflects the current state of political instability in Libya wherein decisions are politically motivated and often forced at the barrel of the gun rather than agreed upon through public consultation and democratic decision-making.

Since questions of post-atrocity accountability began to surface in regard to the “Arab Spring,” there has been interest in the pursuit of international-led justice in countries that have experienced uprisings, such as Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. There were calls for the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in both Libya and Syria. The ICC has become involved only in Libya. However, this involvement has become mired in struggles that expose the challenges of a system that some regard as simply another expression of a profoundly undemocratic international order.

The situation in Libya one year after the attack on the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi on September 11, 2012 is chaotic, dysfunctional and disheartening. It remains not as abjectly horrible as it could be—the General National Congress did this summer finally approve a framework (however imperfect) for electing a constitutional assembly, and UN-backed efforts are under way to create an unofficial dialogue of national reconciliation—but these advances paper over ever-deeper failings, many of which were not inevitable.